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Criminal Intent 
By Andrew McGee and Andrew Garwood-Gowers, School of Law, QUT 
Introduction 
The High Court recently heard submissions of counsel in Zaburoni v The Queen. This case 
concerns an appeal against conviction for transmitting a serious disease with intent under 
section 317(b) and (e) of the Queensland Criminal Code. It raises important issues about the 
meaning of intent and how intent can be proven in Queensland criminal offences. 
Since intent is an element of so many of the more serious crimes, it is surprising to see that 
the courts, both in England and Australia, continue to grapple with how best to define it. In 
murder, for example, the accused is potentially going to be locked up for a very long time, so 
it is essential that the courts and juries are very clear on what intent actually means, so that 
they can be confident in correctly finding that it was present on the facts of the case. 
In the Zaburoni case, Zaburoni, the appellant, knew he was HIV positive but concealed this 
from his partner. He engaged in unprotected sex with her over a significant period of time 
and she contracted HIV as a result. 
He claims he did not intend to infect his partner, but pleaded guilty to the less serious offence 
of causing grievous bodily harm (under section 320 of the Code). However, he was convicted 
of the more serious offence, which requires intent and can carry a longer prison term. 
The Criminal Code doesn’t define “intent”, so the word bears its ordinary, natural 
meaning.  The Crown must prove that “the appellant’s conduct was designed to achieve that 
result” (Reid case). That is, the defendant aimed for the result, or achieving the result was his 
purpose in engaging in the conduct. 
It can be hard to tell what somebody’s intention, purpose, or aim is. One important criterion – 
somebody’s sincere claim that they intended to cause outcome X – is normally unavailable in 
criminal cases, where the accused denies intending the consequence (death, HIV 
transmission). It is because the accused has denied it, that we are in court trying to find out 
what his or her intent really was. 
Where there is no confession, we may have to accept that we can’t prove intention beyond 
reasonable doubt. Without a confession the jury will need to infer the accused’s state of mind 
from facts established by the evidence.  This is tricky where an accused may have been aware 
of some risk in acting in a certain way but claims not to have intended the result that 
occurred. One option we must be wary of is thinking that it suffices to prove intent to show 
that the accused had the consequence in mind when he or she acted. 
2 
 
Zaburoni’s lawyers claim he was reckless in engaging in unprotected sex, but that this does 
not equate to intending to transmit HIV and so should have been acquitted of the more 
serious offence. 
How, then, should we understand intent? Is there a need to go beyond purpose or aim when 
defining intent? 
The courts appear to think so, and have grappled with this issue for many years. 
A recent example comes from the transcript of the Zaburoni High Court appeal, where both 
barristers and judges alike explain intent in quite different ways. 
We think there are two fundamental reasons why the law has struggled with this issue. 
Intention and desire 
First, the law has correctly distinguished between intention and desire. You can desire things 
you have no intention of bringing about, as when I desire to go to the Caribbean but don’t 
currently have the means or time to go there. 
It is also correct to say that we can infer intention from desire, eg, if you have made claims 
that you ‘want Joe Bloggs dead’ and you have dropped a boulder from a bridge onto a car, 
thereby killing Joe Bloggs. 
However, the courts have gone further and said that you can intend to bring about a 
consequence you don’t desire to bring about. This is, we believe, mistaken. 
Take mercy killing. You may regret that someone wants to die and pleads with you to end 
their life. It might be the last thing you ‘want’ to do. But if you choose to kill the person over 
leaving them to suffer, you do want that outcome more, out of the two possible outcomes. 
Your motive may be compassion, but you do want them to die to avoid more suffering. 
Wanting an outcome can be consistent with regretting, or being sad, that it occurs. You can 
regret that it is the best of all the available options but, to the extent you judge it to be the best 
and act on that judgement, you want that outcome. But the courts have assumed otherwise. In 
countless cases on the issue, a standard formula in court judgments is that ‘you can intend an 
outcome that you do not desire’. 
This is not true, and is one of the main reasons why a satisfactory account of intent has yet to 
be given. Acceptance of the claim you can intend but not desire an outcome is inconsistent 
with the definition of intent in terms of purpose, for a purpose is, by definition, something 
you want to bring about. So this mistake forces the court to regard the purpose definition as 
insufficient. 
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The confusion stems in part from an example given in R v Moloney, which said: “A man 
who, at London airport, boards a plane which he knows to be bound for Manchester, clearly 
intends to travel to Manchester, even though Manchester is the last place he wants to be and 
his motive for boarding the plane is simply to escape pursuit.” (Moloney). 
Although in one sense this man has no particular desire to go to Manchester – his motive for 
jumping on the plane simply being to escape pursuit – he nevertheless wants to go there if he 
chooses to board that plane over others. 
Only if he boarded the plane without thought for its destination at all, could we say he had no 
desire to go there at all – but if he boarded without thought for its destination, we can equally 
say he had no intention to go there, his intention simply being to escape. 
In short, insisting you can intend an outcome without desiring it deprives the court of an 
important criterion for telling a jury what an intention is. 
Intention and foresight 
Failure to see the conceptual connection between intention and desire has led the courts into 
dense thickets, trying to find what an intention really is – hence the second problem, which is 
to identify it with foresight of virtually certain consequences. In an English case (Woollin), 
Lord Steyn said ‘a result foreseen as virtually certain is an intended result’. This is where, as 
noted above, there is a danger of incorrectly equating intention with what the accused had in 
his or her mind when acting. The accused might simply have been aware of the high 
probability of its occurring but had some other consequence in mind, as with the police 
officer case mentioned below. 
Foresight of virtually certain consequences can be evidence from which one can infer intent, 
provided that there is other evidence that also leads to that conclusion (such as motive). It 
needs other evidence because foresight of virtually certain consequences does not equate to 
intent.   
A police officer can be virtually certain that breaking the bad news to relatives of a lost loved 
one will upset them, but he doesn’t intend to upset them in such cases. So foresight definitely 
cannot equal intention. But if there is evidence they are actually alive and he knows this, then 
his breaking the ‘news’ would then, together with that evidence, allow an inference of an 
intention to upset the relatives. 
Interestingly, there is empirical evidence that we are more likely to find intent if the 
consequence is morally bad, rather than good. Joshua Knobe carried out well known 
experiments showing that our moral judgements influence findings of intent, whereas it 
ought, of course, to be the other way round. 
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The courts should therefore be wary of judging what the accused has done to be 
reprehensible, and so of defining intent in terms of reprehensible conduct where serious 
consequences are foreseen. 
Once the claim that ‘you can intend an outcome you don’t desire’ is rejected, the courts will 
no longer be tempted to move beyond purpose or aim to other concepts that may stretch the 
meaning of intent. It will be interesting to see how the High Court decides the issue of intent 
in Zaburoni. 
